The+Changing+Face+of+Star+Wars

Alice Hughey " The Changing Face of Star Wars," //Annals of American History.// <[]> [Accessed June 23, 2009].

The Changing Face of Star Wars Alice Hughey //The National Voter//, September/October 1986

The challenges of ballistic missile defense—that is, defending against a Soviet missile attack—are daunting. Theoretically such a system would involve a “layered” defense, in which missiles could be destroyed in all four phases of flight: the boost-phase (2 1/2–5 minutes), when missile engines are burning and producing noticeable emissions; the post-boost phase (5–8 minutes), when reentry vehicles containing warheads and penetration aids are dispersed; the midcourse phase (25 minutes), when reentry vehicles and thousands of decoys float through space; and the terminal phase (20–50 seconds), when reentry vehicles descend through the atmosphere and head toward their targets. To accomplish these tasks, a variety of “directed-energy” (lasers and particle beams) and “kinetic-energy” (highspeed rockets and bullets) technologies are being explored. As described by its proponents, an SDI defense might include hundreds of orbiting battle stations equipped with rockets or lasers to attack Soviet missiles as they are fired. Other missiles might be launched from many sites on earth upon warning of an attack. The Fletcher panel, appointed by President Reagan following his March 1983 speech, formulated an SDI plan that envisioned a system of four to five layers containing a number of space-based elements, each layer having a “leakage” or failure rate of about 20 percent. But new studies by Pentagon contractors of potential SDI “architectures” (the configuration of weapons in a defensive shield) completed in 1985 instead proposed a system of up to seven layers, each with an average leakage rate of as much as 40 percent. In contrast to the Fletcher plan's design for space-based elements, the options laid out in these new studies contained few or no space-based components. This design shift reflects disappointing results in developing key SDI technologies. A March 1986 staff study conducted at the request of Senators Proxmire (D WI), Johnston (D LA) and Chiles (D FL) reported that the Administration has downgraded, reoriented or given new missions to almost one-half of SDI's weapons projects because of technological difficulties. For example, the space-based chemical laser, which was being considered for the task of boostphase attack, has been downgraded in importance because, according to the Senate report, “there was too much evidence indicating that space-based chemical laser weapons had serious operational limitations that would make them militarily ineffective.” The neutral-particle beam effort has changed from research as a potential defensive //weapon// to use in discriminating between decoys and warheads in flight. The same fate has befallen the x-ray laser, which is now only being considered in the near-term for discrimination purposes. Overall, the report concludes, there is a change in emphasis in the directed-energy program from //weapons// to //discrimination// functions. The free-electron laser, on the other hand, has been upgraded as a potential weapon for boost-phase defense, but serious problems remain, including building the laser beam, projecting it through the atmosphere and constructing the elaborate space-based mirrors off which to reflect the beam. Contributing to the technical problems is the fact that the Administration has committed itself (and its successor) to a decision by the early 1990s on whether to proceed with full-scale development and deployment of an SDI system. Because of this self-imposed deadline, experiments and research are being driven by the schedule rather than by technological progress, according to the Senate staff report. This means it is likely that “a development decision in the early 1990s would be made not only with significant risks, but also with significant gaps of information.” One of the stiffest technological challenges is making SDI weapons effective against missiles in the boost-phase of flight. Most scientists agree that boost-phase defense is critical. This first line of defense would have two to five minutes to shoot down enemy missiles before they split into separate warheads and decoys. If the Soviets developed “fastburn” boosters, which burned their fuel within two minutes, the defense would have even less time to react. And if the defense is ineffective in the boost-phase, the problems of defense in the midcourse phase, when missiles have multiplied into warheads, become even more difficult. In addition, the Soviets are likely to develop countermeasures to a U.S. defensive system such as hardening rocket boosters against attack or spinning them to evade laser beams, developing lasers of their own to attack the U.S. defense and creating decoys and disguises for missiles. Even presuming that SDI weapons worked, scientists would have to determine how to put the defense in place and maintain it. The Senate staff report concluded that “the transportation-support-logistics system for a comprehensive strategic defense may well be as complex and unprecedented as the defense itself.” The most recent studies of potential SDI architectures predicted that 20 to 200 million pounds of SDI material would have to be put into space, a feat requiring from 600 to 5,000 space shuttle flights. The baseline (minimal) architecture reportedly calls for lifting 58 million pounds into orbit at a cost in today's dollars of $87 to $174 billion for transportation alone. With the recent failures of the //Challenger// space shuttle and the Titan and Delta rockets, the United States now has almost no launch capacity. But even if this capacity is developed, the time involved is staggering. SDI officials have estimated that it could take as long as eight years just to physically deploy the system. Added to these difficulties is the challenge of designing the computer software to coordinate and operate such an elaborate defense system. A December 1985 report by a Department of Defense panel of computer experts (nicknamed the “Eastport Study Group”) singled out this issue as the paramount strategic defense problem. Asked to examine the computer design requirement for an SDI system, the panel concluded that a space-based defense is theoretically feasible but that existing designs are likely to fail because too much emphasis has been placed on weapons and hardware and not enough on the computer software needed to make the system work. According to the authors of the report, “These architectures are not likely to be implemented successfully because they demand excessively sophisticated software and can not be adequately tested.” As significant as these problems are, perhaps the most important set of issues facing U.S. policymakers is the role of SDI in U.S. strategic policy and in arms control. Behind the existing limits on missile defenses embodied by the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are the assumptions: (1) that because of the enormous firepower of nuclear warheads, offensive weapons have an insurmountable advantage over defensive systems; (2) that the large-scale deployment of missile defenses would be inherently destabilizing and dangerous, as each side increased its offensive nuclear forces to penetrate or overwhelm the other's defenses; and (3) that an arms race in offensive and defensive weapons would be prohibitively expensive for both sides. Within the Administration, tough lines already are being drawn over the role of SDI in shaping future U.S. policy. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary Richard Perle have waged a battle within the Administration to reinterpret the 1972 ABM Treaty to permit development and testing of space-based defensive weapons and to reject the SALT II limits on offensive weapons. Others, including Secretary of State George Shultz, have advocated a more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, at least for the time being, and believe that potential limits on SDI should be discussed with the Soviets in exchange for reductions in offensive weapons. The Soviet Union recently proposed that both nations continue adhering to the ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years in exchange for deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Statements made by Soviet officials, including Soviet leader Gorbachev, outside the formal negotiating arena have indicated a willingness to permit laboratory //research// on missile defense programs. President Reagan has stated in the past that SDI will create incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate reductions in offensive weapons, particularly Soviet land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). Implicit in the President's statement is a belief that SDI has some value as an arms control bargaining chip. Yet press reports containing details of the United States' July 25 response to the latest Soviet offer indicate that President Reagan does not want to bargain and that his long-term goal is that of securing Moscow's agreement to //deploy// space-based missile defenses, not to ban or limit them on either side. //New York Times// correspondent Leslie Gelb wrote in a July 27, 1986 article, “[Reagan] is giving Moscow a choice: Either stay with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which permits withdrawal from observance and deployment of new systems on six month's notice, or sign a new treaty that would delay the deployments as much as seven years, after which the two sides could deploy jointly or the United States would go ahead alone.” In other words, the U.S. position appears to have shifted from describing SDI as a research effort to explore the //feasibility// of deploying defenses to discussing actual //deployment// of defenses. According to the //New York Times// article, Reagan's letter is also said to state that, while the deployment of a space-based defense is delayed, he intends to proceed with development and testing of related ballistic missile defense technologies. If carried out, these plans will result in the ultimate abandonment of the ABM Treaty in favor of a nationwide defense system. The recent U.S. decision no longer to be bound by the provisions of the unratified but until-now-observed SALT II limits on offensive weapons also has raised important issues for SDI. If existing limits on offensive weapons are removed, SDI's task becomes even more difficult. Some experts argue that the Soviet Union, because of its existing strategic weapons development programs, is in a much better position to “break out” of the SALT II limits than the United States. Thus, reneging on the SALT limits now may result in a much larger Soviet offensive threat. … Three years after the President's introduction of Star Wars, the United States by its actions has moved sharply away from the SALT I ABM Treaty and SALT II arms control framework. In so doing, it has rejected the fundamental assumptions behind the ABM Treaty's limits on missile defenses—that offense always beats defense, that missile defenses are destabilizing and that arms races in both offensive and defensive weapons are prohibitively expensive. While discarding and dismantling the existing arms control framework in order to pursue SDI, the Administration appears to be be trying to persuade the Soviets to deploy nationwide defenses along with the United States. The most recent U.S. proposal suggests that any future arms control agreements should be based on some mix of offensive and defensive weapons. But if the original assumptions behind the SALT agreements remain valid—and there is no historical or current evidence to suggest otherwise—the dramatic shift away from the existing arms control framework that is reflected in the Strategic Defense Initiative may signal the onset of an uncontrollable escalation of the nuclear arms race and the end of arms control.